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Abstract:  
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is, to examine the optimal pricing and ordering strategy of 
two competing chains with customer returns in Bertrand-Nash game and Stackelberg game, 
and to investigate in what cases the manufacturer can make more profits from customer 
returns policy. 
Design/methodology/approach: We build the customer returns model in the competing 
chains and compare the equilibrium results in Bertrand-Nash game with that in Stackelberg 
game. 
Findings: The main contribution of the present study is the manufacturer can benefit from 
customer returns policy, only if customer return rate is sufficiently low in two games. In 
addition, the optimal price, order quantity and profits in Stackelberg game are affected more 
seriously by customer returns than that in Bertrand-Nash game.  
Originality/value: The impact of customer returns on the competing chain is initially 
considered, where the demand is related with the retail price and return price. 
Keywords: competing supply chain, consumer returns, Bertrand-Nash game, Stackelberg game 
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1. Introduction  
Accepting customer returns has been an important strategy for retailers to attract customers 
and stimulate demand, in the increasingly competitive market environment. Customer returns 
policies can enhance customers’ confidence in purchasing goods, stimulating the demand and 
possibly increasing the retailer’s market share. However, it is also bound to increase the 
retailers’ and the manufacturers’ processing cost, or may even devaluate the goods and delay 
sales if the returned goods are resold after some processing. It has been reported that the 
value of products returned in the United States has exceeded $100 billion per year (Stock et 
al. 2002). Hence, from an operational standpoint, a natural question emerges: how should two 
effects of customer returns be traded off to yield greater profits?  
This paper is related with literatures on customer returns policy. Customer returns impact the 
decision-makers’ pricing and ordering strategies. In general, they can use full refund policy, 
which is a 100% money-back-guarantee (MBG) offered to ensure consumer satisfaction, or 
offer partial refund policy for customers.  Mukhopadhyay and Setoputro (2004) study the 
optimal retail price and return price of reverse logistic in e-business. William and Gerstner 
(2006) report that, in their limited sample, 87% of the stores offer full money back guarantee 
within a “return period”. Chen and Bell (2009) address the simultaneous determination of price 
and inventory replenishment when customers return product to the firm. They examine the 
cases when the quantity of returned product was a function of both the quantity sold and the 
price, in single and multi-period problems, with and without uncertainty in demand. Su (2009) 
studies the impact of full returns policies and partial returns policies on supply chain 
performance, and proposes coordination strategies. He demonstrates that full returns is 
excessively generous and thus fails to optimize supply chain performance.  
Competition has become a hot topic in the area of supply chain management. The research of 
this paper is related with competing supply chains. At present, most studies concentrate on 
two supply chains for simplicity. There are several factors which cause the competition, such 
as the quantity of product, price, quality and warranty period and so on. Choi (1991) 
investigates two manufacturers facing the same retailers competed on price. Bernstein and 
Fedegruen (2004) examine a supply chain system competing on price and fulfill rate, and 
demonstrate the existence of Nash equilibrium. Boyaci and Gallego (2004) consider three 
competition scenarios between the supply chains, including the uncoordinated scenario, the 
coordinated scenario and the hybrid scenario. They find that coordination is a dominant 
strategy for both supply chains, but as in the prisoner’s dilemma, both supply chains are often 
worse off under the coordinated scenario relative to the uncoordinated scenario. Moorthy 
(1988) studies a model with two identical firms competing on product quality and price, and 
suggests that cannibalization has different effects on product strategy than competition. Then, 
Banker (1998) examines the quality and price competition of two supply chains. Recently, 
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Chen (2012) investigates the optimal decision of the manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader 
and two retailers as the followers when the demand is dependent on warranty period.  
In the competitive market, customers choose which one of supply chains depending on the 
price to a certain extent. Therefore, the market demand is related with price. In general, the 
market demand decreases in the retail price. Considering the customer returns, Mukhopadhyay 
and Setoputro (2005) investigates a single supply chain, where the market demand is seen as 
a linear function of retail price and return price, and obtain the optimal pricing and return 
policy to make the profits of the supply chain maximize. However, they ignore the competition 
environment. So, how will customer returns affect the optimal pricing, ordering and supply 
chain performance in the competitive environment? To address the question, we consider the 
demand is related with the retail price and return price of both the supply chain itself and the 
competing supply chain. Ofek et al. (2011) investigate the impact of product returns on the 
strategies of multi-channel retailers in duopoly settings. However, we emphasis on this impact 
in different games (Bertrand-Nash and Stackelberg game).   
Bertrand-Nash game and Stackelberg game in Game theory have been commonly applied in 
supply chain management in recent years. Bertrand-Nash game refers to the situation where 
two firms compete with each other on price and act simultaneously, and then each one 
chooses the price conditional on the other firm’s price decision. The Stackelberg game refers to 
the situation where one firm as a leader acts firstly, then the other firm as a follower set price 
in response to the leader’s price. In this paper, we study how the change of return price 
impact on the competing supply chain under the conditions of Bertrand-Nash game and 
Stackelberg game.  
This paper is different with the above literature. Firstly, we initially consider that the demand is 
related with the retail price and return price of both the supply chain itself and the competing 
chain. Secondly, the return price considered in this paper is not limited to the full refund, but it 
can change from 0 to the retail price.  
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we state the related problem 
and build the consumer returns model in the competing chains. Then, we give and analyze 
equilibrium results in Bertrand-Nash game and Stackelberg game respectively, in Section 3. In 
the following Section 4, we obtain the conditions where the manufacturer can benefit from 
providing consumer returns policy. In Section 5, we give numerical examples to illustrate how 
consumer return rate impact the equilibrium results. The last section summarizes the research 
findings and future research directions. 
 
 
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.601 
 
 
- 152 - 
 
2. Problem statement and model 
There are two competing supply chains in the same market, where the manufacturer sales the 
substitutable product directly to customers in one single sale period, and accept the customer 
returns. Such policy can improve manufacturer’s profit through stimulating demand, but it can 
also increase the manufacturer’s processing cost because of the higher customer returns. The 
problem defined in this paper is that how to take the effective measure to balance the positive 
effect and the negative effect of customer returns.  
In the market, customers who choose the product in which one of supply chains consider on 
the retail price pi (i=1, 2) and return price ri (i=1, 2), which is refund amount the 
manufacturers give back to customers. Let ri ≤ pi (i=1, 2).  
We assume that the retailer’s demand Di(p, r) (i=1, 2) is related with both retail price and 
return price in two supply chains, and it is the linear function of them. That is  
( , ) , 3 .i i j i jD p r a bp cp r r j i                        
(1) 
Because the retail price limits the range of the return price, we can assume
1 1 1r p , 2 2 2r p , 
where 10  2, 1  . 1 2 0   denotes neither of supply chains chooses customer returns 
policy. 1 2 1    denotes both supply chains choose the full refund policy. Generally, 10  , 
2 1   denotes that both supply chains choose the partial refund policy. So, the ith chain’s 
demand function becomes  
( , ) ( ) ( ) .i i i j jD p r a b p c p                           
(2) 
Let the parameters a , 0b  , 0c  , 0  , 0  . a  is the initial market demand, which 
reflects the whole developing level of the products. b  denotes the demand responsiveness to 
the supply chain’s retail price, while c  denotes the demand responsiveness to its rival’s retail 
price.   denotes the demand responsiveness to the supply chain’s return price, while   
denotes the demand responsiveness to its competitor’s return price. The parameters 1 , 2  
are called return factors, and reflect the size of return price. We require b  , c  , 
1 2b c     and 2 1b c    .  
In this paper, the production cost is not considered and products have no salvage value at the 
end of sales period. We assume the inventory quantity is adequate, and the return rate is iH ,
1,2i  , respectively.  
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Then, the ith chain’s profit is  
( ) ( ) (1 ) [ ( ) ( ) ].i i i i i i i i i i i j jp p H D p H p a b p c p                   (3) 
3. Supply chain competition equilibrium results 
In this section, we analyze equilibrium results in Bertrand-Nash game and Stackelberg game 
respectively.   
3.1. The equilibrium results in Bertrand-Nash game 
In Bertrand-Nash game, each supply chain decides its retail price conditional on that of its 
competing supply chain, which develops a duopoly market. Therefore, the ith chain’s 
equilibrium retail price  
[( ) 2( )] .iB j jp c b Ua                                 (4) 
Where  
1
1 2 1 24( )( ) ( )( ) .U b b c c   

       
The ith chain’s equilibrium demand becomes 
( )[2( ) ( )] .iB i j jD b b c Ua                          (5) 
The ith chain’s equilibrium profit is 
2 2 2(1 ) ( )[2( ) ( )] .iB i i i j jH a U b b c                    (6) 
3.2. The equilibrium results in Stackelberg game 
In Stackelberg game, without loss of generality, we assume that supply chain 1 is a leader and 
supply chain 2 is a follower. Then, the decision sequence is that supply chain 1 firstly set the 
retail price 1p , and then supply chain 2 chooses the optimal retail price to make its profit 
2 1 2( , )p p  maximize. Then, the ith chain’s optimal retail price is 
0[( ) ( )] .iS j jp a b c U                               (7) 
The ith chain’s equilibrium demand is  
0 1 2( )( ).iSD U a b b                                    (8) 
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Where  
1
0 1 2 1 22( )( ) ( )( )U b b c c   

      . Therefore, in Stackelberg game, the ith 
chain’s equilibrium profit is  
2 2
0(1 ) [( ) ( )]( )( ).iS i i j j i jH U a b c b b                   (9) 
3.3. Analyze the impact of return price on retail price, order quantity and profits 
In this subsection, we analyze the impact of return price on the optimal retail price, order 
quantity and profits, and we also compare the optimal price, order quantity and profits in 
Stackelberg game with that in Bertrand-Nash game. We obtain some conclusions as follows.  
Proposition 1 
In Bertrand-Nash game and Stackelberg game, the optimal retail price 
1Bp , 1Sp  increase in 
1 , and the optimal retail price 2Bp , 2Sp  increase in 2 . If c b  , then the optimal retail 
price
1Bp , 1Sp  increase in 2 , and the optimal retail price 2Bp , 2Sp increase in 1 . Otherwise, if 
c b  , then the optimal retail price 
1Bp , 1Sp  decrease in 2 , and the optimal retail price 2Bp
,
2Sp  decrease in 1 .  
From Proposition 1, in Bertrand-Nash game and Stackelberg game, we conclude that the 
optimal retail price of each supply chain increase in its own return price. This suggests that two 
competing supply chains should improve their retail price to win the profit, when they increase 
the return price. The change of the optimal retail price with the return price of its competing 
one is dependent on c
 
and b . 
Proposition 2 
1 1S Bp p , 2 2S Bp p . Furthermore, if 2 1  , then 2 1S Sp p and 1 2B Bp p . Otherwise, if 
2 1  , then 2 1S Sp p  
and 2 1B Bp p .  
Proposition 2 shows that in Stackelberg game, the retail price in two supply chains is higher 
than corresponding that in Bertrand-Nash game. In addition, both in Stackelberg game and 
Bertrand-Nash game, if the return price in supply chain 1 is higher (lower) than that in supply 
chain 2, then the corresponding retail price is also higher (lower).  
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Proposition 3 
If c b  , then the optimal order quantity 
1BD , 2BD  , 1SD  and 2SD increase in 1  and 2 . 
Otherwise, if c b  , then the optimal order quantity
1BD , 2BD  , 1SD  and 2SD decrease in 1  
and
2 . 
Proposition 4 
1 1S BD D , 2 2S BD D . 1 2S SD D . Furthermore, if 2 1  , then 1 2B BD D ; Otherwise, if 
2 1  , then 1 2B BD D .  
From Proposition 4, we know that overall in Bertrand-Nash game the order quantity in two 
supply chains is higher than corresponding that in Stackelberg game. In additions, in 
Stackelberg game, the order quantities in two competing supply chains are same. In Bertrand-
Nash game, the changing trends of the optimal order quantity are opposite with that of the 
return price.  
Proposition 5 
If c b  , then the optimal profit 
1B , 1S increase in 2 , and the optimal profit 2B , 2S
increase in 
1 . Otherwise, if c b  , then the optimal profit 1B , 1S decrease in 2 , the 
optimal profit 2B , 2S  decrease in 1 . 
Proposition 6 
1 1S B  , 2 2S B  . Furthermore, in the case of c b  , if 2 1  , then 2 1S S  and 
2 1B B  . Otherwise, if 2 1  , then 2 1S S  and 2 1B B  . In the case of c b  , we 
have 2 1S S  and 2 1B B  .  
Proposition 6 suggests that the profits of two competing supply chains in Stackelberg game are 
larger than corresponding that in Bertrand-Nash game. Furthermore, in the case of c b  , 
when the return price of the competing supply chain is smaller (larger) than that of its own 
supply chain, the profits of competing supply chain are larger (smaller) than that of its own 
supply chain. In the case of c b  , it has an opposite trend.  
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4．Managerial Insights 
From the above Section, we can see the consumer return rate H impacts on the 
manufacturer’s profit. Therefore, in this section, let 
1 2= =0   and we obtain the equilibrium 
profits without the manufacturers’ consumer returns policy in Bertrand-Nash game and 
Stackelberg game, respectively. Then, we will further to investigate in what cases the 
manufacturer can be beneficial for providing the customer returns policy.  
Without consumer returns policy, the manufacturers’ equilibrium profits in Bertrand-Nash 
game are same, and they are  
 
2
0 2
2
B
a b
b c
 

. 
The manufacturers’ equilibrium profits in Stackelberg game are same, and they are 
 
2 2
0 2
2 2
( )
.
2
S
a b b c
b c

 

 
Comparing 
iB (i=1,2) with 0B , we obtain Proposition 7 as follows. 
Proposition 7 
In Bertrand-Nash game, the manufacturers can make more profits from consumer returns 
policy than that without it, only if  
  
2
2 2
1
0 1 .
2 [2( ) ( )]
i
i i j j
bU
H
b b c b c   
 
   
      
 
Proposition 7 shows that in Bertrand-Nash game, if consumer return rate is sufficiently low 
such that 
  
2
2 2
1
1
2 [2( ) ( )]
i
i i j j
bU
H
b b c b c   
 
  
      
, the manufacturer can be 
beneficial from consumer returns policy. Otherwise, if consumer return rate is sufficiently high 
such that 
  
2
2 2
1
1
2 [2( ) ( )]
i
i i j j
bU
H
b b c b c   
 
  
      
, consumer returns policy 
cannot make the manufacturers benefit, and the manufacturers should take no returns policy.  
Comparing iS (i=1,2) with 0S , we obtain Proposition 8 as follows. 
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Proposition 8 
In Stackelberg game, the manufacturers can make more profits from consumer returns policy 
than that without it, only if  
 
2 2
0
2
2 2
( )1
0 1 .
2 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
i
i j j i j
U b b c
H
b c b c b b    
    
         
 
Proposition 8 shows the similar conclusion with Proposition 7. That is, in Stackelberg game, the 
manufacturers can be beneficial from consumer returns policy, only if consumer return rate is 
sufficiently low.  
5.  Numerical example 
In this section, through numerical examples, we will illustrate how the return price impact on 
the supply chain’s optimal retail price, order quantity and profit. Then we also investigate how 
the change of return rate impacts the optimal profit. 
5.1 The impact of the return price on the optimal retail price 
In the basic model, we let parameters 1000a  , 20b  , 15c  , 8  and 6, 5  . These 
can make sure two supply chains positive profit. When 1 0.8   and 2  changes from 0 to 1, 
we analyze how the retail price changes with the return price.  
 
Figure 1. The change of the retail price with the return price in two games 
From Figure 1, we can obtain 2 2 2 2S Bp p      and 1 2 1 2S Bp p      . It shows that in 
Stackelberg game the retail price is more seriously impacted by the return price than that in 
Bertrand game, whether from its own chain or from the competing chain.  
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5.2 The impact of the return price on the optimal order quantity 
 
Figure 2. The change of the order quantity with the return price in two games 
From Figure 2, we can obtain that 
1 2 1 2B SD D       and 2 2 2 2S BD D      . It shows 
that in Stackelberg game the retail price is impacted by its own chain’s return price is larger 
than that in Bertrand-Nash game. However, it is impacted by the return price of its competing 
chain in Stackelberg game is smaller than that in Bertrand-Nash game. 
5.3 The impact of the return price on the optimal profit 
In the basic model, we let parameters 1000a  , 20b  , 15c  ,
 
8  and 6, 5  , 
1 2 0.9H H  and 0.1. When both 1 and 2 change from 0 to 1, we will analyze the change of
1B , 2B , 1S and 2S in four cases. 
In the model of this paper, the structure of two competing supply chain is symmetric whether 
in Stackelberg game or in Bertrand-Nash game. Therefore, we only analyze the change of the 
profits in one of supply chain, and we can obtain the change of the profits in the other chain 
through exchanging 1  with 2 .  
Case 1. When c b  ( 8  ) and 1 2 0.1H H  , we can have Figure 3 as follows. 
 
Figure 3. The change of the optimal profits with the return price in two games 
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From Figure 3, we know that when c b  and the return rate is lower, the maximum profits of 
two supply chains can be achieved at 
1 2 1   .  
Case 2. When c b  ( 8  ) and 1 2 0.9H H  , we can obtain Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. The change of the optimal profits with the return price in two games 
From Figure 4, we know that when c b  and the return rate is higher, the maximum profits 
of two supply chains can be achieved where the own supply chain takes no return policy and 
the competing supply chain takes the full refund policy.  
Case 3. When c b  ( 6  ) and 1 2 0.1H H  , we can have Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. The change of the optimal profits with the return price in two games 
From Figure 5, we know that when c b  and the return rate is lower, the maximum profits of 
two supply chains can be achieved where the own supply chain takes full refund policy and the 
competing supply chain takes no return policy.  
 
 
 
 
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.601 
 
 
- 160 - 
 
Case 4. When c b  ( 6  ) and 1 2 0.9H H  , we can obtain Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. The change of the optimal profits with the return price in two games 
From Figure 6, we know that when c b  and the return rate is higher, the maximum profits of 
two supply chains can be achieved at both the competing supply chains taking no return 
policy. 
From the Figures, besides the conclusion of Proposition 5 and Proposition 6, we can also know 
that 
1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2,S B S B             . These suggest that the profits of two competing 
supply chains in Stackelberg game are affected greater by the return price than that in 
Bertrand-Nash game.  
5.4 The impact of the customer return rate on the optimal profit 
Because of the symmetry of supply chains, we can need to illustrate the impact of the return 
rate 
2H  on the optimal profit 2B  and 2S . Here, we obtain Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7. The change of the optimal profits with the return rate in two games 
Figure 7 shows that when the customer return rate changes from 0 to 1, how the profits of 
supply chains change with their return price both in Stackelberg game and in Bertrand-Nash 
game. From the above Figure, we can see when customer return rate is lower, the optimal 
profit increases with the return price both in Stackelberg game and in Bertrand-Nash game. 
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However, when customer return rate is higer, the optimal profit decreases with the return 
price. Furthermore, the results above suggest that the profits of two competing supply chains 
are influenced simultaneously by the customer return rate and the return price of supply chain.  
6. Conclusion 
Customer returns policy is an important decision for firms to strive and develop in the fiercely 
competitive market. In this paper, we first solve the equilibrium results with the manufacturers’ 
consumer returns policy in Bertrand-Nash game and Stackelberg game. Then comparing them 
with that without consumer returns policy, we find that the manufacturers can make benefits 
from consumer returns policy, only if consumer return rate is sufficiently low. In additions, we 
analyze the impact of the return price on the optimal retail price, the optimal order quantity 
and the optimal profit. Through the propositions and the numerical analysis, we conclude that 
the retail price and order quantity are affected only by return price, but the profits of supply 
chains are influenced by both return price and customer return rate. In addition, retail price, 
order quantity and profits of two competing supply chains in Stackelberg game are affected 
greater by the change of return price than that in Bertrand-Nash game.  
In the future work, we will further consider when the demand is dependent on the return 
price and retail price, but the return price is independent with the retail price, the optimal 
pricing and ordering decision. In additions, incorporating the strategic consumer behavior into 
the consumer returns model in a duopoly setting is a future research direction. 
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